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FOREWORD
In recent years, international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) like Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International have described U.S.-led drone
strikes in Pakistan, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
as atrocities and even war crimes. Both the International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights
Watch have asked whether the United States is violating the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), with Human
Rights Watch suggesting that the United States should
be prosecuted for its actions. At the same time, the
International Committee for Robot Arms Control
(ICRAC) has called for greater regulation of what they
term “killer robots.”
How might military leaders best respond to these
allegations? In this insightful analysis, Dr. Mary
Manjikian offers a framework for understanding the
different types of anti-drone arguments made by policymakers, NGOs, academics, and other states. As she
points out, the arguments vary―some opponents are
concerned that too much power is given to algorithms
and technologies in making decisions about human
life. Others are concerned about factors such as executive overreach or the ways in which policymakers
might become overly dependent on a military option,
which is relatively cheap and easily deployable. In
order to respond, we need to know what the critic is
really asking. What are their concerns, and how might
these concerns best be addressed? Dr. Manjikian provides a framework to distinguish between ethics arguments concerned with technology, those concerned
with policy, and those concerned with strategy. She
then provides specific guidance as to how policymakers and leaders might respond to each specific concern.
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As we confront rapidly changing technologies and
learn to operate and maneuver in a new technological environment, this analysis helps to provide a road
map and a set of responses to the ethical and normative challenges that we may encounter.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
While there is widespread opposition to the acquisition and deployment of drones for both surveillance
and combat units at the mass and elite levels, individuals and groups differ in the specifics of their arguments. Among domestic and international opponents
of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies, we
can identify arguments that take issue with: specific
aspects of the weapons themselves (such as their ability to target precisely); the character of an individual
or society that uses these weapons; the ways in which
these weapons can change the relationship between
a combatant and his adversary; or the way that this
technology creates new international norms or doctrines for the conduct of warfare. Thus, anti-drone
arguments come in different variants, rely on differing assumptions, and lead to differing policy recommendations―from an absolute ban on their existence
to a more nuanced set of guidelines for their creation
and deployment. For a commander or planner who
wishes to respond to ethical arguments being raised
about drones, this Letort Paper can serve as a type of
field guide, helping the decision-maker to identify the
type of argument being made and the specific concerns
which undergird this type of ethical thinking. Knowing
this information, decision-makers are better equipped
with specific responses to address these concerns.
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A TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTS
ABOUT DRONE ETHICS
Today, drone use is commonplace; and yet, it is not
without controversy. Data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, notes
that at least 11 countries are using 56 different types of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).1 Despite the widespread use of drones worldwide both for combat and
surveillance purposes, the ethics of their use is still
highly contested, and opposition to their acquisition
and deployment is widespread. A Pew Research Center
Study in 2012 indicated that 52 percent of Germans, 76
percent of Spaniards, 63 percent of the French, and 90
percent of Greeks are opposed to the use of drones.2
Arguments made at national and international levels
and anti-drone initiatives have been presented to the
European Commission and the United Nations (UN).
However, not all anti-drone arguments are alike.
In formulating a response to these arguments, U.S.
policymakers need to understand the varied sources
of opposition to drones and the variety of ethical and
policy arguments on which this opposition rests. Individuals and groups may oppose drones and their use
for a variety of different reasons based on different
underlying principles, values, and worldviews. Thus,
as American policymakers seek to convince our allies
of the importance of these weapons and as we speak to
the international community about the utility of these
weapons, we need to understand what these ethical
concerns are, and why opponents have them.
As this Letort Paper discusses, the term “anti-drone”
can be seen as a sort of umbrella under which a variety
of different types of arguments and concerns can be
located. Some anti-drone activists are concerned with
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the harms done to the international system through
reliance on these new weapons (such as the erosion
of traditional norms governing combat); others, however, focus in on a much more intimate level, speaking
of the emotions of attack victims or the emotional lives
and well-being of the warfighters themselves. Some
analyses focus on individual morality and the ethics
of the drone operator himself, while others consider
the national values of an actor deploying drones. Still
others consider how drone use changes relationships
between the warfighter and his adversary. Some analysts and activists treat the advent of drone warfare as
a wholly new phenomenon that cannot be compared
to previous technological developments, while others
disagree. Analysts also distinguish between problems caused by the existence of the technology―those
caused by the acts carried out by drones and those created by the activities of their human operators or the
machines themselves.
In addition, some opponents describe UAV technologies as dangerous because they lead to the adoption of certain doctrines or strategies, while others
worry that they lead to certain policy outcomes. Thus,
some opponents state that drones make it easier for a
leader to declare war without congressional approval
(a policy problem), while others are concerned about
the fact that they make covert activity in general a more
feasible option (a doctrine problem). Those who worry
about the policy problem are concerned that drones
could potentially change the character and shape of
our political system (including the relations between
the President, the Congress, and citizens). Those concerned about the ways in which UAV availability will
cause us to adopt different doctrines worry about a
different outcome, namely the ways in which such
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weapons might end up changing many of the norms
and understandings that contribute to the stability of
the international system.
All arguments about the ethics of drones are normative because they suggest what should be done
regarding drones. However, the solutions put forth
exist along a spectrum—with some arguing for limited drone use, provided that certain conditions are
met; and others arguing for a total ban on drone use,
since they see the weapon’s very existence as an ethical
problem. Finally, arguments differ in the timeframes
used. Some analysts worry how drone warfare might
change the conduct of a particular battle (i.e., whether
one side had an unfair advantage). Others argue that
increased drone use could affect a nation’s long-term
strategy, including how it thinks about its own vulnerabilities and what is possible (i.e., it might make the
nation more belligerent or increase the likelihood of
events escalating to a military level).
As discussed earlier, the term “ethics of drones”
actually refers to many different phenomena. This
Letort Paper presents a typology of anti-drone arguments. It will help military leaders respond to questions about the ethics of drones by helping them
understand the underlying assumptions and concerns
that motivate such questions. The leader can identify
and label the arguments encountered; understand
the philosophical, cultural, and ethical assumptions
underlying that argument; and then frame a response
that responds to those concerns.3
There are five specific types of questions and
approaches that we can identify in today’s anti-drone
discourse, both those occurring on elite levels among
policymakers and those occurring on a popular level
that might be demonstrated through protests, petitions,
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or critical articles in newspapers and magazines. These
five variants are: (1) arguments about technological
specifications; (2) arguments about identity; (3) arguments about relationships between the warfighter
and his or her adversary; (4) arguments about effects
on the international community; and, (5) arguments
about specific doctrines and tactics related to the use of
drones (see Table 1).
Academic
Framework

Argument
Technological
Specifications

Proponents

Utilitarianism, Pacifists:
Society of Friends
ConsequenMennonite Church
tialism
USA
United Brethren
Human Rights
Watch
Harvard Law
School’s International Human
Rights Clinic
(IHRC)

Identity
Arguments

Virtue Ethics

Campaign to Stop
Killer Robots

Key Questions
Do the new and unique
aspects of these weapons (i.e., increased
precision; ability to
discriminate; speed)
make them more or
less moral/ethical than
previous generations of
weapons?
Do these weapons save
lives, and if so, whose?
Would an honorable
warrior (or nation) use
these weapons?
What kind of a person
or nation does so?

Relationship
with Adversary

Levinasian
Ethics
Ontology

UN Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons

Is using this weapon an
appropriate way to treat
my enemies?

Amnesty International

Table 1. Five Types of Ethical Arguments
Against Drones.
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Argument
Effects on
International
Community

Relationship to
Specific Doctrines, Strategies, Tactics

Academic
Framework
Norms
Legitimacy

Proponents
European Parliament
Independent and
Peaceful Australia
Network

Just War
Situational
Ethics

Key Questions
What sort of an example are we (the United
States) setting in the international community?
Are we changing the
norms/laws of war?

Stephen Hawking,
Elon Musk, and
Steve Wozniak
(Apple co-founder)

How does the use of
these weapons affect
our ability to fight a just
war?

Electronic Frontier
Foundation

Will having these weapons make us more likely
to adopt certain policies
and doctrines?

Project on Government Secrecy
at Federation of
American Scientists

What are the effects of
surveillance drones in
particular on rights of
citizens?

Table 1. Five Types of Ethical Arguments
Against Drones. (cont.)
First, some activists worry about the weapons’
technical capabilities. These activists draw on writings
from the fields of robotics, legal studies, and moral
philosophy including machine ethics to advance concerns about the new and novel facets of autonomous
weapons—as well as their inherent limitations. They
ask not “How should we use drones or under what
circumstances?” but rather “What specific facets of the
evolving technology of unmanned or robotic combat
weapons are likely to create new or ongoing ethical
dilemmas?” Autonomous weapons are thus viewed
5

not simply as a new stage of technological advancement—like other types of technological advances that
have occurred before—but rather as something revolutionary that will lead to a reconceptualization of
the conduct of warfare and the notion of the warrior.4
These arguments focus on two aspects: how some
aspects of new technologies will change the playing
field and the conduct of war; and whether new technologies can ever substitute for or behave in a similar
moral, ethical, and legal way as that of a human.
In considering technological capabilities, opponents have focused on four specific facets of this technology. First, they consider ethical quandaries arising
from its ability to target precisely (that is, viewing it
as a new type of precision-guided munition). They
have asked whether resultant actions truly are those
of national self-defense, or whether they are, in fact,
extrajudicial killings or assassinations. Second, they
have considered its ability to establish a combat environment in which the adversary is unable to respond
or reciprocate with violence (thus raising questions
of cruelty and disproportionality). Third, they have
looked at the fact that these weapons are faster and less
obtrusive to use than conventional military deployments, thus increasing the likelihood that they would
be used in covert activity-type scenarios. Finally, analysts have considered whether such weapons actually
are more moral because they can easily discriminate
between civilians and armed military personnel. These
facets of the technology have led legal analysts to ask
whether technical specifications of the weapons themselves make them incompatible with existing ethical
and legal frameworks, including: the Law of War and
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), UN treaties and
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conventions, and the beliefs of those in the field of
human rights (see Table 2).
Technological aspects
of drones

PRECISE

SAFE

CHEAP, FAST

ABLE TO
DISCRIMINATE

Related ethical questions
Ability to easily target an adversary raises
issues of:
• targeted killing, assassination
• extra-judicial killing vs. self-defense
• preemptive killing
However, may also prevent a conflict from
escalating to conventional war.
Enemy cannot immediately retaliate:
• Raises Issue of Cruelty
• Issue of Disproportionality
Do not require large-scale conventional
mobilization:
• Facilitates use of covert options
• May create increasing “conditions short
of war” (jus ad vim)
IF you believe this exists, drones are an
ethical advance.
IF you dispute this claim, they are more
dangerous.

Table 2. Technological Aspects of Drones and
Related Ethical Issues.
These technological arguments about drones actually rest on two different philosophical stances. The
utilitarian stance assumes that an ethical problem
can be solved in the same way as a math problem.
One can add up the costs and benefits of various policies in order to arrive at the solution that creates the
least harm while providing the greatest benefit. Analysts ask, “What are the specific costs associated with
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deployment/existence of these technologies? Do these
technologies make the overall human costs of war
higher or lower?”
However, other analysts (and activists) advance a
“difference argument.”5 This stance assumes that there
is something fundamentally different about UAVs that
distinguishes them from previous categories of weapons. The assumption is that these new weapons alter the
nature of conflict itself in such a way that it no longer
can be carried out within norms and constraints that
serve to limit it or render it humane. Thus, it is impossible to argue for its ethicality. Difference arguments
were previously made by those who advocated outlawing nuclear weapons and biological and/or chemical weapons.6 In each case, proponents argued that
facets of these weapons—the sheer amount of damage
and world-ending potential of a nuclear weapon7 or
the sheer amount of human suffering produced by a
biological weapon—rendered it fundamentally different from all other weapons. In both the biological and
the nuclear examples, the phrase “uncivilized” was
used to describe why no reasonable or ethical individual would choose to utilize such a weapon.
Difference argument proponents find drones unethical, even if they are never used, since it is their existence rather than a specific activity carried out which is
problematic. This argument is absolute and one cannot
identify any good situations or good scenarios in which
such a weapon ethically could still be used. The only
possible resolution in such a situation is the banning of
this class of weapons such that they should no longer
be developed, held, or deployed. This is the argument
that Jonathan Granoff makes currently,8 and the argument in Reinhold Niebuhr’s writing about the atom
bomb.9 Pacifist arguments about drones, including the
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arguments of Mennonite groups in England and the
United States, also fit into this category of argument.
The second group of arguments focuses not on specific technical facets of the weapons themselves, but
rather on the identity questions posed by the existence
and deployment of such weapons. Activists using this
framework pose questions such as: “What sort of a
person, warrior, or society uses these weapons?” and
“Does using autonomous or unmanned weapons conflict with the warrior ethos?” Key concepts include: the
warrior code, honor, agency, bravery, heroism, risk,
guilt, remorse, and emotions. This stance is derived
from the writings of Patrick Lin, Peter Olsthoorn, and
Jessica Wolfendale―academicians concerned with
medicine, psychology, and the ethics of technology.10
Identity arguments lead to policy prescriptions that
are absolutist; one either is or is not the kind of person
or society that uses drones, regardless of the circumstances or the type of conflict. In this framework, the
decision to use drones is said to reflect one’s character
and values, and the decision thus is based not on the
specifics of a set of circumstances. At base, these arguments derive from the philosophical school known
as Virtue Ethics, and from Aristotle’s writing on the
ethics of virtue.11
Identity arguments focus on three questions: first,
analysts and activists ask, “What are the qualities of
an honorable warrior, and are those reconcilable with
the the use of drones?” Next, they ask, “What are the
qualities of a dishonorable warrior, and does the use
of drones somehow convey or create dishonor?” Proponents believe that the decision to use these weapons
could taint the character of the warrior, the organization, or the nation that does so. Thus, these weapons
have been described as “the symbol of an arrogant
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reprobate superpower dating back to the days of the
Ugly American.” Kenneth Anderson notes they may
be regarded as illegitimate weapons used by those
who know that their cause is illegitimate.12 For activists adopting this framework, the drone primarily is a
symbol that conveys a certain meaning. Thus, they ask,
“What does it say about me and my nation that I would
choose to use an autonomous weapon in an asymmetric fashion, and what is the moral/ethical meaning
attached to that action? Is using a weapon that puts
my opponent at great risk while lessening my own a
cowardly action or could it be perceived as such? How
does the use of these weapons impact my personal reputation, the reputation of America’s armed services, or
the reputation of the United States?”
Finally, those concerned with identity raise a third
issue referred to as the humane/humanity issue: The
question is, “Who is doing the killing?” Proponents
thus suggest that, if UAVs are not manned by humans,
then their use can never be described as honorable
or humane since those are qualities attached only to
human beings. Analysts concerned with this question
have disagreed about whether one could, in theory,
create a “virtuous drone” that could behave according
to a warrior code through making programming decisions which would allow artificial intelligence (AI) to
make moral decisions—or whether a “virtuous drone”
is an oxymoron.
Table 3 describes the various ethical queries related
to the problem of identity.
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Identity Aspects

Related Ethical Questions

The Virtuous Warrior

Can the use of drones be reconciled with the
notion of an honorable warrior?

The Dishonorable
Warrior

Is there something specific about using an
UAV that creates dishonor or an impression
of dishonor?

Human/Humane
Argument

In what ways is the ability to inflict damage
without creating a relationship between the
warrior and his adversary ethically problematic?

Table 3. Identity Aspects of Drones and Related
Ethical Queries.
The next set of activists is concerned primarily with
the relationship that one creates with one’s adversary
(either an individual or a nation or group) through
choosing to fight using this type of weaponry. This set
of arguments draws upon the philosophical subfield of
ontology defined as the “study or concern about what
kinds of things exist.”13 Many of the concerns regarding the autonomy aspect of unmanned weapons and
the ways in which autonomy relies on AI are ontological concerns, since analysts are asking: “Can we make
a computer which is fully human?” or “Can we make
a computer which is close enough to a human that it
could be substituted for a human and in what ways?”
These questions range from quite mundane to quite
profound. The simplest question is whether a robot
could learn to calculate things like proportionality or
assess independently the legality of an action or order.
More profound questions include what it means to
be autonomous, and what the inherent limits are of a
robot in terms of its ability to think and act morally
and ethically in combat. Can a computer really ever
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substitute for a human on the battlefield in terms of its
ability to behave as a moral agent?
Activists using this line of argumentation draw
upon the work of ethicists who have asked, “How does
my use of a nonhuman drone change my relationship
with my adversaries?” and “Is it ‘disrespectful’ to kill
someone with a drone?” Analysts whose work deals
primarily with these questions include Peter Asaro,
Robert Sparrow, and Albert Bandura, as well as Deborah G. Johnson and Merel Noorman.14 The key concepts are human rights, the philosophical concept of
respect, mutual vulnerability, practices of responsibility, and the principle of attribution. Analysts also consider issues such as mourning, humiliation, humanity,
and distance, as well as the potential to dehumanize
one’s enemy (see Table 4). These arguments often draw
upon David Grossman’s seminal work, On Killing,
which examines the relationship created between soldiers when they battle one another in conflict, as well
as the emotional consequences of that relationship.15
Arguments about the relationships created through
UAVs rest on older arguments. Anthony C. Grayling
(author of Among the Dead Cities) meditates on the ways
in which new technologies enabled the Allies to carry
out large-scale aerial bombardment campaigns during
World War II and the ethical questions that these campaigns raised.16
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Relationship
Aspects

Related Ethical Questions

Witness, Mourning

Can a drone witness a death in the same
way that a soldier can?

Remorse, Guilt,
Anguish

Can a drone feel remorse in the same way
that a soldier might?

Responsibility

Can a drone take responsibility; or be held
responsible for a death?

Limits of Machine
Learning

Can a drone be taught to think ethically?

Table 4. Relationship Aspects of Drones and
Related Ethical Queries.
A fourth set of arguments asks how UAV technologies will affect the international system as a whole
in the long-term. Analysts ask, “Will states go to war
more often if the risks are lowered?” In addition, they
consider how technologies develop and the ways in
which using drones for surveillance affects society in
the long term. Key ideas that analysts rely upon in this
ethical framework include conventions and norms, as
well as facets of international law.
Finally, analysts have considered how developments in the field of unmanned warfare make organizations and nations more likely to adopt certain types
of tactics that can be seen as unethical. The major concepts invoked are the LOAC and principles such as
national sovereignty. Analysts argue that the availability of weapons like unmanned aerial drones serve to
facilitate the conduct of covert warfare or increase the
likelihood that a state could prosecute a conflict without ever declaring war. Military strategists and legal
analysts describe these types of arguments.
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We will now consider each of these types of arguments in turn.
TECHNOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
ABOUT DRONES
Drones are really only good at targeted killings and that is
something that German soldiers will not engage with.17
A preemptive prohibition on the development and use of
these weapons is needed.18

The first set of ethical arguments about drones
focuses on technology. Activists who highlight the
technological aspects of drone warfare do so based on
the assumption that technological specifications—such
as the ability to fire very precisely—go on to affect what
the planners see as possible or desirable in warfare.
That is, they argue that specifications can force planners and decision-makers to adopt some strategies or
tactics over others. In this way, these anti-drone activists resemble gun control activists in the United States
because they believe that there is something particular
about this weapon that is dangerous. Therefore, they
argue, such weapons should be banned because they
do not accept the claim that it is possible to modify or
regulate these weapons (or the behavior of their users)
in such a way as to make the weapons less dangerous.
These advocates reject the argument that states or international organizations can create rules for the ethical
use of these weapons through, for example, adopting
international conventions and national laws. They do
not believe that regulatory policies ultimately will be
successful in modifying what they see as the ideology
or the technological mission of this equipment.
So what technological specifications can be seen as
driving military decision-making? First, analysts are
14

concerned about the fact that drones allow for greater
specificity and precision in targeting—and they argue
that the ability to engage in targeting with greater precision will lead to an erosion of the distinction between
the civilian sphere and the battlefield, a situation which
may place civilians at greater risk in the future.19 Both
Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) argue that such
weapons would increase the risk of death or injury to
civilians during armed conflict.20
Next, analysts raise concerns about proportionality. Traditional Just War thinking declares that a state’s
response to an attack on itself must be proportionate,
rather than punitive. That is, the state must use only
enough force to stop the aggressor’s actions and must
not seek to inflict damage beyond that point. However,
when one state has a new technological advantage, at
least initially, its response seems disproportionate in
relation to its adversaries who may not have access to
similar technology. Therefore, Granoff suggests that
the real ethical issue is not proportionality, but reciprocity, since it is inequitable for one power to have
expensive technologies that others do not. In talking
both about nuclear weapons and drones, he argues
that such weapons are immoral, even if never used,
since it is their existence, even in a deterrent capacity,
which is problematic. He argues that since states with
nuclear weapons can threaten others by creating a
power imbalance, these nuclear-armed states can then
use the power of that threat to compel other states to
act in the interest of the nuclear-armed state. Everyone
who is subject to a possible use of these weapons in
the future, in a sense, lives under a kind of suspended
sentence. Granoff also argues that it is immoral to ask
others to live under a nuclear or a drone umbrella when
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the citizens of the well-armed country do not have to
live under the same threat.21 Thus, the UAV becomes a
type of terrorist.
A related problem is that of cruelty. In Britain, this
argument has found resonance. Consider the statement made by British Lord Bingham in 2009, in which
he noted:
From time to time in the history of international law
various weapons have been thought to be so cruel as to be
beyond the pale of human tolerance. I think cluster bombs
and landmines are the most recent examples. It may be
. . . . That unmanned drones that fall on a house full of
civilians [are] a weapon the international community
should decide should not be used.22

Bingham identifies drones as belonging to a category of weapons that has been prohibited in the conduct of warfare—first through customary international
law and later through the 1977 Additional Protocol to
the Geneva Convention of 1949. The protocol specifically limits the use of weapons and methods of warfare
“of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.”23 Weapons in this category include
poison, explosive bullets, chemical weapons, and landmines. A member of the Quaker faith expresses similar
sentiments in a letter to the editor of The Friend, noting,
“The pressing of a button to send a drone to destroy
a target, killing innocent people, too, including children, is as barbaric, to me, as the cruel beheading of
hostages.”24
The next technological facet of drone technology
that is seen as ethically problematic is its cheapness
and ease of use. Pacifist groups, including religious
ones, argue that technologies that make war faster,
cheaper, and safer will lessen the moral imperative to
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avoid war. Instead, such groups point to the danger
of an arms race where each side will attempt to amass
a larger number of weapons than its opponents. They
argue that, since defense spending always “robs” social
spending and, thus, has opportunity costs associated
with it, and since amassing a large stockpile of weapons eventually may make the temptation to go to war
greater, the most logical solution is to ban all weapons.
We can identify similar thinking in the current Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. This group points to the
problem of proliferation and the possibility of a future
robotic arms race that particularly would be difficult
for developing nations to engage in without increasing defense spending at the expense of other societal
sectors.25
Like older pacifist groups that campaigned against
conventional weapons in World War I, the present-day
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots notes that “replacing
human troops with machines could make the decisions
to go to war easier, which would shift the burden of
armed conflict further onto civilians.”26 The precision
strikes and relative safety in which drone operators
carry out their missions are seen as problematic, since
it is easy for both warfighters and the public to forget
about the actual costs of war. In addition, Anderson
notes that the ability to carry out a discrete drone strike
facilitates decision-making in which the warfighter
sees a particular decision only in its own specific context without being aware of a larger context, such as
the surrounding area, the larger political conflict, or the
values that the conflict is meant to be upholding. He
notes, in particular, that the individual who launches
a drone strike asks only a very specific battery of questions, such as “Is it a civilian? Is it holding a gun?”27
Again, these questions may be understood as virtue
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ethics questions since they are really questions about
the characters of the states and warfighters themselves,
who may choose to think differently about conflicts in
which they do not physically participate, including a
decision to dehumanize one’s opponents or to treat the
conflict as a sort of joystick-video game interaction.
Finally, analysts have raised questions about the
fact that drone strikes can be carried out without a
high level of public involvement or transparency.
For example, Richard Adams and Chris Barrie argue
that the ease in which a drone may be deployed, not
as part of a larger effort but rather on an individual
basis, fundamentally changes the nature of warfare.
It increasingly is likely that drone strikes will take
place as part of a planned covert activity that does not
require transparency or the involvement of the public.
They also worry about the establishment of a system
in which killings become routine.28 Daniel Bell notes
as well that the ability to act quickly may lead inevitably to a system where nations are more likely to act
swiftly and preemptively, and the ability to carry out
discrete activities, such as a single killing, inevitably
may lead to a great amount of covert activity and less
transparency.29 Finally, Noel Sharkey has pointed to a
2010 report to the UN General Assembly, which states
that drone strikes violate international law and human
rights conventions, noting, “a lack of disclosure gives
states a virtual and impermissible license to kill.”30
Table 5 presents the various types of technological
arguments that have been made against drones and
their implications.
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Technological
Facet
Discretion/
Precision

Precision

Argument

Implications

Technology is/is not
sufficiently able to distinguish civilians from
combatants

Violates Just War Tenets, International Law,
Human Rights Norms on
not targeting civilians

Technology allows us to
erase the distinction between what is and is not
the battlefield—thus increasing risk to civilians

Violates Laws of War
which define the battlefield as the place where
war occurs

Proportionality

Technology is dispropor- Violates Just War Tenets, International Law
tionate/punitive in relation to the act itself

Proportionality/
Cruelty

Some weapons/technologies are uncivilized,
“beyond the pale”

Violates International
Humanitarian Law

Cheapness

Drones reduce both absolute monetary and human costs of war, thus
paradoxically making it
more likely

Violates “last resort”
condition of Just War

Violates Hague Convention International Protocol for Declaring War

Cheap/Fast

Drones allow for strikes
to be conducted secretly
and covertly—as opposed to a mass military
action which would be
public in nature/banality,
bureaucratization of
warfare

Table 5. Technological Arguments against Drones.
Responding to These Arguments
How should U.S. military planners respond to specific ethical arguments that seem to point to recommendations for a ban on UAVs? It is clear that these
arguments are well thought-out, coherent, and based
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on sound logic. However, this does not mean that one
cannot advance a counterargument.
The starting point for a counterargument should be
to challenge the assumption that technology has an
ideology or that it necessarily means a specific thing.
Here one might refer to the arguments of Maine et al.,
who note that, when new technologies are introduced
into the conduct of warfare, it is common for policymakers and others to disagree about the ethical issues
that arise. However, they argue that over time, international communities and military communities often
are able to come to a new understanding regarding
the specific ethical challenges posed by a new technology and are able to come up with legal and normative
understandings that serve to mitigate or solve these
ethical dilemmas. (They point to the development of
aerial combat as well as the development of nuclear
technologies.)
Policymakers might also cite James Jay Carafano,
who argues that:
Technology does not win wars. It does not lose wars. It
does not even fight wars. People do. . . . New technologies
pose far fewer new ethical challenges to warfare than is
often supposed.31

In this work, Carafano suggests that what look like
ethical discussions actually are military-strategical
technical discussions about the capabilities of various
weapons. Thus, based on his arguments, military decision-makers could and should challenge the assumption that technology makes people do things or choose
things, such as compelling decision-makers to reach a
certain conclusion about how to deploy these weapons. Instead, decision-makers need to point out that
individuals and states have the ability to choose how
to use technologies.
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Similarly, David Fischler wrote the following about
nuclear weapons:
Possession of nuclear weapons, then, is not inherently
immoral. Possession may facilitate the demonstration of
the user’s immorality, but in and of themselves nuclear
weapons are nothing more than mechanisms for the
expression of human ideas and emotions. To say that
there is nothing inherently immoral about nuclear
weapons does not, however, establish that we are justified
in having them. One does not keep dynamite in the house
in order to ward off burglars when a pistol would do as
well. One is, after all, as likely to blow up the house as
protect it when the weapon is out of proportion to any
conceivable threat.32

Thus, we can draw a parallel between his argument
and that of Maine et al., who suggest that the question
of whether a technologically advanced state should
inflict a disproportionate response (such as deploying a “swarm” of drones) is really a question of virtue
ethics. The individual needs to ask himself or herself,
“What would the right thing be to do in this situation?”33 Thus, the proportionality question becomes
not a matter of technological specifications, but rather
of identity ethics, since the ethics question revolves not
around the specifications of the weapons, but rather
about “What sort of a person or state would choose
to develop, hold, or utilize these weapons, given what
we know about proportionality and reciprocity?” This
identity question is discussed later in this Letort Paper.
In responding to criticisms about the immorality
of a particular technology, policymakers might also
consider Peter Singer’s work, since he famously has
argued that humans ultimately decide what a technology means and how it will be used. He argues that
no weapon inherently is immoral, and that, indeed, a
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designer has the unique ability to shape what a technology becomes, in some instances even assuring
that it will be more, rather than less, moral. He notes
designers can make decisions that guide the ways in
which these technologies are deployed, including the
ability to make some kinds of deployment more likely
and other types impossible. He argues that designers
can ask ethical questions, such as “What attributes
should one design into a new technology, such as its
weaponization, autonomy, or intelligence? What attributes should be limited or avoided?”34
Figure 1 presents some specific guidance for creating a response to these types of anti-drone arguments.
Response Guidance
1. Challenge the assumption that technology has an ideology.
(i.e., The internet represents democracy; drones represent
offensive aggression.)
2. Challenge the assumption that technology makes people do
things or choose things. Instead, point out that individuals
and states have agency to choose how to use technologies.
3. Interrogate the assumption that the only way to prevent
certain outcomes is to ban certain technologies.
4. Engage with the difference between weapons, which are
indiscriminate and which are cruel (i.e., engendering
needless sufferering), pointing out that drones are neither
indiscriminate nor cruel.
5. However, acknowledge that some technologies make some
types of activities (strategies, tactics) more or less likely.
6. Be willing to discuss the sorts of national or international
standards or safeguards that will affect how these weapons
are used and articulate the U.S. commitment to pursuing
regulations.

Figure 1. Suggestions for Military Decision-Makers
in Responding to Arguments about Technological
Facets of Drone Technology.
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IDENTITY ARGUMENTS ABOUT DRONES
At one stroke, the drone has destroyed any positive
image of the United States in the countries over which it
operates. It has contributed to the destruction of the tribal
codes of honor, such as Pukhtunwali among the Pukhtun
tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this immorality
and destructive nature reflects back on those who use it,
harming the warrior ethic of the American military so
critical to battlefield bonding among soldiers in combat.35

The second set of ethical arguments comes from the
philosophical tradition of virtue ethics. Ethicists and
activists taking this stance do not seek a mere solution set to the problem of drones that would reduce
casualties and costs; instead, they ask “What choices
regarding the creation or deployment of UAVs would
be in keeping with my values and the values of my
organization?”
Olsthoorn describes a virtue as “a trait of character worth having, not to be understood as an inherited or God-given quality, but as something that can
be acquired, mainly through training and practice.”36
Within the U.S. military, as Shannon French points out
in Lin et al., warfighters acquire certain values such as
duty and honor through socialization, education, and
practice. Warfighters grow to understand and accept
the moral significance of their actions and integrate
that knowledge into their own self-concepts. As stated
in Lin et al.:
Warriors exercise the power to take or save lives, order
others to take or save lives and lead or send others to
their deaths. If they take this awesome responsibility too
lightly―if they lose sight of the moral significance of their
actions―they risk losing their humanity and the ability to
flourish in human society.37
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Similarly, Thomas McDonnell introduces the
notion of chivalry,38 defined as a principle based on
“mutual respect and reciprocity between adversaries
sharing the same or similar traditions and subjected
to the same dangers on the battlefield.”39 McDonnell
suggests that both individual warriors and states can
inflict damage without themselves being subject to
damage through conducting drone strikes, which represents a violation of the warrior code’s emphasis on
chivalry. Thus, someone or some nation using drones
can be described as cowardly or as constructing a situation in which the strong are taking advantage of the
weak.
In this framework, then, actions are associated with
values, and the assumption is that, ideally, individuals and states would create situations in which their
actions and their values are aligned. For this reason,
soldiers are trained in processes such as the LOAC and
legally may be held liable if they violate these laws
during a conflict. Jessica Wolfendale suggests, “The
ideal of the good war fighter involves not only technical skills but also moral virtues.”40
Thus, questions about virtue ethics give rise to
three separate but interrelated queries:
1. How does the use of drones affect the individual warfighter and his identity?
2. How does the use of drones affect the nation
and its identity?
3. Is it possible to separate individual moral thinking from “thinking” by a weapon? That is, if we
envision a situation someday in which drones
can act as fully autonomous agents in making
decisions about the conduct of warfare without
human influence, can one ever speak of a drone
acting autonomously as a “warrior” or as “one
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who possesses warrior ethics”? Can a machine
be taught to think morally or virtuously, according to a warrior code?41
Thus, the first query asks whether drones help create
situations where individual soldiers and states act in
ways which are not aligned with their professional or
historic values, or where the disconnect between their
values and their activities is great enough that it threatens their legitimacy and integrity. In its most stark
form, the argument (as put forth by the Australian academic Natalie Dalziel) is that drone strikes are a form
of terrorism defined as sudden and disproportionate
symbolic violence deployed to intimidate those who
would witness it, and that those who engage in it are
terrorists.42 A statement like this calls into question the
whole U.S. military enterprise, since the military virtues of honor and integrity are what create the difference between socially and ethically sanctioned killing
in war, versus murder.
Arguments at the interstate level ask how the U.S.
decision to engage in drone strike activity could undermine its claims regarding its role as a democratic leader
in the international system. Many of those who have
opposed U.S. drone strikes have accused the United
States of knowingly engaging in behavior regarded as
illegitimate, unlawful, or immoral. As a result, some
analysts suggest that the nation’s image can become
tainted within the international community through
being associated with unsavory practices.43 Consider
how America’s national image may have been marred
due to accusations related to its drone practices—specifically, accusations that the United States has engaged
in lying, has acted like a bully, and has engaged in
assassinations. In the recent past, the United States has
been accused of lying or exaggerating its claim that it is
lawful to engage in targeted drone strikes in Pakistan,
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for example, because of a need for self-defense against
terrorists and insurgents.44 That is, legally a nation
is allowed to engage in preemptive strikes against a
target for means of self-defense, but the claim is disputed that the United States actually felt it to be in
imminent danger from the individuals whom it targeted. The United States also has been accused of lying
when it claimed that those killed in drone attacks have
been specific insurgents and rebels, and not merely
innocent bystanders.45 Others have implied that the
United States has acted as a bully, killing defenseless civilians46 and invading the sovereignty of other
nations though carrying out airstrikes in their airspace.
Finally, some analysts have constructed virtue
ethics arguments specifically related to the quality of
autonomy. Here scientists ask whether one could create
in an artificially intelligent weapon that could stand
in for a human as a moral agent, making a moral
decision regarding whether to engage in a specific
behavior. In her work, Jamie Allinson speaks of the
“sovereign’s right both to command death and to
assign grievable meaning to the dead,” and suggests
that there may come a time in the future when a state
might arrogate those rights to a piece of technology
instead.47 Others have asked whether, at some point in
the future, one could create a “virtuous drone” which
could be trained in laws and ethics, taught to make
moral decisions, and held responsible for its actions
during wartime.48 Can one actually create a moral algorithm and reasonably speak of war as a moral enterprise when the individuals who possess the moral
conscience are removed from the enterprise?
Analysts are divided about whether the ability to
create a moral or virtuous robot is something that is
either possible or desirable. At one end of the spectrum, Ronald Arkin speaks of an “ethical governor”
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or an algorithm that could be written to allow robots
to learn to think morally. He argues that code could
build in constraints such as the Law of War and Rules
of Engagement, such that weapons would be able to
evaluate a situation and see if certain actions were
allowable. In addition, he argues that a weapon could
learn to evaluate the proportionality of an action.49
Arkin also famously suggested that a robot could learn
to experience sympathy and guilt.50 In his view, it is
incorrect to say that a warrior was not virtuous just
because that warrior was a robot.
However, at the other end of the spectrum are
those who believe that a moral or virtuous robot is an
oxymoron. Wolfendale argues that a moral warrior
must experience guilt and remorse in combat, since a
moral agent needs to have the ability to reflect on his
or her actions critically. Although Wolfendale was not
writing about drone combat, but rather about whether
individual soldiers might be given pharmaceuticals to
dull or deaden their emotions in combat, her argument
may be extended to thinking about drone warfare as
well. She argues that moral reasoning rests on one’s
emotional reactions to a situation, and that lessening
one’s emotions necessarily will lessen one’s ability to
reason morally.51 Thus, a drone that cannot experience
emotions also cannot engage in critical reflection that
Wolfendale sees as necessary for one to be truly virtuous. Similarly, Dennett argues that for a robot to be
a moral agent, it would have to have a past, would
have to be able to exhibit consciousness, and have a
conscious moral understanding of its choices. Dennett
raises similar issues and asks whether a robot could
ever really understand what it means to kill a person
or the opportunity costs involved in such an action.52
Similarly, Purves et al. argue that “moral judgement
is not codifiable, i.e., it cannot be captured by a list of
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rules.” Purves et al. note that a machine cannot reflect
upon its actions in the same way as a human since it
does not possess a “moral imagination, or the ability to
have moral experiences with a particular phenomenological character.”53 Finally, as Sharkey has argued, “a
machine cannot exercise mercy or act humanely.” He
notes:
To be humane is, by definition, to be characterized by
kindness, mercy, and sympathy. . . . These are all human
attributes that are not appropriate in a discussion of
software for controlling mechanical devices.54

He disagrees with Arkin, who feels that robots could
be taught/programmed to demonstrate sympathy and
guilt.55
Finally, Purves et al. raise the question of right
intention, the moral principle of Just War theorizing,
which suggests that, in a just war, one goes to war only
for the “right reasons,” such as self-defense or to right
a moral wrong, rather than for the wrong reasons such
as racism, a desire for revenge, or greed. Purves et al.
suggest that it is meaningless to argue that a computerized drone would be able to calculate whether it possessed the “right intention,” asking instead whether a
computer can even be said to have an intention or wish
to protect someone.56 However, like Singer, others have
argued that since a robot does not possess emotions, it
will never go to war for the wrong intention, since it
would be incapable of wishing, for example, to inflict
revenge on an enemy.57
As Table 6 indicates, each of the “identity arguments” starts from the assumption that a warrior is
more than the sum of his or her specific actions, and
that the goodness of one’s actions therefore cannot be
derived by simply adding up the costs and benefits of
a particular tactic or strategy. Rather, the implication is
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that each of these actions together speaks to the character of the actor, whether we are talking about an individual or a state. Individual character or the character
of the state rests on the individual’s activities as well
as how those who witness them perceived these activities. Because activities represent one’s character, it thus
is impossible for a machine to substitute for a human
being, since ultimately it is nonsensical to talk about
the moral character of a machine, according to this particular set of arguments.
Argument

Implications

Drone strikes are a
form of terrorism

Undermines the U.S. national reputation internationally.
Harms an individual soldier’s self-image.

Drone strikes are
not an honorable
form of warfare

Violates the principles of reciprocity, mutual
injuring, risk, norm of “chivalry.”
May harm morale in unit, may harm soldier
psychologically.

Covert activities are
incompatible with
the nature of deliberate democracy

Harms U.S. legitimacy in international system.

Covert activities are
unlawful

The United States is viewed as not respecting
rule of law.

Drone strikes are a
form of assassination

Violates international military norm of chivalry.
Violates international Law.

A machine can never Technology is fundamentally incompatible with
replicate the Warrior many norms of warfare.
Code
A machine can never Technology is fundamentally incompatible with
understand the mor- virtue ethics.
al repercussions of
its actions because
it lacks self-reflective capacity

Table 6. Identity/Virtue Ethics Arguments
about Drones.
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Responding to These Arguments
In conflating drone attacks with such moral failings
as lying, cowardice, and bullying on both the individual and state levels, analysts and activists argue that
military values and the use of drone technology fundamentally are incompatible. In this view, the use of
such technologies often cannot be reconciled with the
notion of the virtuous warrior.
However, at least one analyst has refuted this
claim. In a 2014 article in the Air & Space Power Journal, Joseph Chapa suggests in situations where one
encounters a media report on the use of drones that
emphasizes some sort of moral or ethical failure, this
is because the media has made a decision to cover a
story about the use of UAVs in a particular way. That
is, foreign and domestic media have made a decision
to draw a line between the use of this technology and
certain behaviors in which it chooses to portray them
as incompatible with honorable behavior. He refutes,
for example, the notion of a “video game warrior” who
blithely kills the enemy from halfway across the world
without investing morally, intellectually, or ethically
in the activities that he is carrying out.58 Chapa argues
that it is not inevitable that U.S. actions and activities
in drone warfare would be viewed or interpreted in a
dishonorable way.
In addition, Caroline Kennedy and James Rogers
have questioned whether it is logical to talk about the
moral character of a drone. Using a situational ethics
perspective (rather than a virtue ethics perspective),
they note that it makes more sense to speak about
the ethics of a drone’s actions in a particular situation. They note that, just as we distinguish between
the soldier and the soldier’s actions―granting that a
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soldier behaved virtuously in this instance but not in
that instance―so, too, can we distinguish between the
character and actions of the drone. Thus, they argue a
drone or robot participating in an unlawful campaign
of extrajudicial killing might be labeled as an ethically
problematic warrior, while a drone deployed on a
peacekeeping mission might be described as virtuous.59
These types of arguments may make it particularly
hard for military leaders to understand or respond to
claims that drones are somehow cowardly or against
military values. Figure 2 presents some guidance for
military leaders wishing to write a response to these
specific types of arguments.
Response Guidance
1. D
 raw upon history to note that many new technologies were
regarded as dishonorable and illegitimate when they were first
introduced.
2. Engage with the question of what makes a technology humane or
inhumane: Distinguish between technologies that are cruel and
dishonorable, which should be banned and which should not.
3. Strive to portray the thoughtful engagement of military personnel
who work with UAVs, emphasizing their training, maturity, and
ability to engage in critical self-reflection.
4. Make the distinction between virtuous character and virtuous
actions – not conflating all drone uses as being the same.

Figure 2. Suggestions for Military Decision-Makers
in Responding to Arguments about Virtue, Honor,
and the Use of Drone Technology.
ARGUMENTS ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS
Machines or systems tasked with making fully
autonomous decisions on life and death without any
human intervention, were they to be developed, would
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be in breach of international humanitarian law, unethical
and would possibly even pose a risk to humanity itself.60

The next set of arguments considers relationships
created between warriors and their adversaries, and
the ways in which this relationship might be altered
and shaped because of its mitigation through technology. In recent years, these arguments have grown in
importance. Many view them as the most compelling
set of ethical arguments against the technology.
These relational arguments are not new or unique,
and analysts have asked the same questions about the
ethics of conventional war. The starting point for a
relational argument is the writing of Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman, a psychologist, whose work On
Killing asks how combat participants themselves make
sense of their actions in ethical and moral terms. Grossman draws attention to “distancing technologies,”
which he states may affect how soldiers think about
killing as well as affecting how they adjust in the long
term to the activities that they have carried out.
The ethical principle at the heart of all the arguments discussed here is respect. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes:
Respect is a particular mode of apprehending the object:
the person who respects something pays attention to it
and perceives it differently from someone who does not
and responds to it in light of that perception.61

In this definition, one can respect an individual or
entity even if one does not approve of or agree with
the opponent since respect has to do with regarding
the other and acknowledging his or her humanity.
(Respect comes from the Latin term respicere: to look
back at, or to look again.)62 The principle that a person
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automatically is entitled to be treated with respect by
virtue of their humanity is traced to Kant’s categorical
imperative that states that one should not treat one’s
fellow man merely as a means to a particular end, but
that one should acknowledge his or her intrinsic worth
and humanity.63 That is, even if one does not agree
with their enemy’s beliefs, values, culture, or way of
life, the principles of respect and dignity mean that
we do not attempt to humiliate or shame our enemies
through practices like defiling the corpses of enemy
soldiers, humiliating prisoners of war, or urinating on
the Koran. The principle of respect says, “Although
you are my enemy, I still accept that you have intrinsic human worth and dignity and I, as a human, am
required to acknowledge your own humanity and
dignity.” Olsthoorn in particular sets up a dichotomy
between humanization and humiliation in which one
humanizes another by finding common ground with
him and attempting to reduce the distance between
oneself and the other.64
The principle of respect forms the basis for much
of our thinking about war crimes, as well as what
constitutes a war crime. The question for ethicists is,
“Do technologies that distance the warfighter from his
opponent automatically create the conditions for him
or her to regard the adversary as somehow less human
or less than human?” (Grossman suggests that the
opposite of respect is dehumanization).65 Ethicist Mark
Coeckelbergh notes that the tendency to treat things
with less respect when they are distant is not new, and
the fear that new technologies will make killing easier
through increasing the distance between oneself and
the opponent also is not new. He draws a line back
to aerial bombardment campaigns conducted during
World War II and goes on to quote another British
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ethicist, Noel Sharkey, who draws the line much further back, noting that ever since the creation of the bow
and arrow, man has succeeded in distancing himself
both physically and psychologically from his prey.66
As a result, he argues, distancing technologies rob the
warrior of empathy since he no longer has specific
knowledge regarding the casualties that he has created. Today’s “drone warrior” may not know his enemy’s name or even how many specific humans he has
killed―any more than the individual who dropped a
bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, or who participated in the
aerial bombardment campaign against Hamburg, Germany, in World War II did.67 As a result of this distance
and lack of knowledge, one can argue that the warrior,
therefore, is unable to behave in an autonomous and
agentic way in which he is aware of the moral consequences of his actions. Nonetheless, he is able to
choose killing as a morally desirable action, which he
has thought through carefully and considered in light
of all the information. Thus, even if the warrior wishes
to behave in a moral way, he or she is unable to do so
because of the situation created by a reliance on autonomous technology.
In addition, as Coeckelbergh and others have
argued,68 such technologies violate the ethical principles put forth by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who
has argued that our duty to our fellow man primarily
is understood as being an encounter with the face of
the other, whereby we acknowledge our duty to him.
Levinas states that we are called to see the face of the
other, who asks, in simplest terms, “don’t kill me.”
Olsthoorn refers to the ability of the ethical warrior to
make an autonomous decision to exercise mercy and
restraint when he encounters the enemy intimately in
a combat situation.
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The question then becomes how one truly can “see
the face of the other” or exercise mercy and restraint
in the less intimate and more distant situation created
by reliance upon the drone.69 The respect approach to
ethics sees the distance provided through the drone
not as simply a force multiplier that makes it easier to
kill others while lowering your own transaction costs,
a situation that a utilitarian ethicist would approve.
Rather, distance is a barrier that prevents one from
encountering his fellow man―we cannot see his face.
In his work, Achilles in Vietnam, psychologist Jonathan
Shay draws upon his experiences counseling Vietnam
veterans to argue that individuals are harmed psychologically through participating in experiences where
they engage disrespectfully with the bodies of their
enemies.70 Thus, technology that allows soldiers to
disengage from a respectful and intimate relationship
with their adversaries is harmful, not just to the adversary but to the soldier himself.
Ethics arguments acknowledge the damage to
the warrior in a situation where he cannot behave
humanely, but their real power comes from the ways
in which they force readers to consider what it means
for the individual who is killed by the drone rather
than by a fellow human. Drawing upon a 2007 article
by philosopher Robert Sparrow, groups like the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots argue that the most basic
human right of all is the right to be killed by another
human being, for otherwise, those who are killed are
viewed merely as vermin, or as something subhuman
whose basic humanity is unacknowledged, even in
their deaths. They invoke the principles of respect and
dignity, drawing upon the claims of Immanuel Kant,
who argued that, regardless of what one has achieved
or what level one is at in society, one nonetheless is
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owed moral recognition or dignity. That is, a human
being should always be regarded as a person. It is from
this viewpoint that arguments about human rights,
including the value of human rights in international
law, are made. The principle of respect undergirds
arguments about why drone killing constitutes a war
crime, while the principle of dignity undergirds arguments about why drone killing constitutes a human
rights violation and thus violates international law.
These activists argue that slaughter by an autonomous machine differs from an honorable killing
in combat because the drone cannot kill in an atmosphere of respect―through regarding the enemy and
acknowledging their humanity, even as one inflicts
damage upon them. They argue that a human deserves
to be killed by someone who understands and marks
the moral significance of that act, by someone who
mourns or feels guilt and who recognizes the humanity of the enemy. Thus, the activists conclude, the least
a human being owes other fellow human beings is the
ability to bear witness to a death. (Indeed, this is why
we bury the enemy killed in battle, and why we do not
desecrate a corpse. In this way, we engage in what Lin
refers to as “honoring their enemies.”71) Table 7 presents ethical and moral dilemmas presented by automated drone killing.
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Relationship Aspects

Related Ethical Questions

Witness, Mourning

Can a drone witness a death in the same way
that a soldier can?

Remorse, Guilt,
Anguish

Can a drone feel remorse in the same way
that a soldier might?

Responsibility

Can a drone take responsibility, or be held
responsible for a death?

Limits of Machine
Learning

Can a drone be taught to think ethically?

Table 7. Drones as Moral Agents and Related
Ethical Queries.
Medical ethicist Jessica Wolfendale argues that
killing is honorable when it occurs in an atmosphere
of respect. In her own work, she questions whether
it would ever be appropriate to engage in cognitive
enhancement that would allow a human soldier to
become numbed to the act of killing through taking a
pharmaceutical. She acknowledges that some medical
personnel advocate for the development of drugs that
would help soldiers not to form memories of killing
in order to spare them the burdens of post-traumatic
stress. However, she argues that doing so would not
allow them to be fully human. Instead, they would be
rendered as a sort of killing machine that would inflict
damage on others without fully participating in the act
of killing. One can build upon her argument in suggesting that fully autonomous drones might act in the
same way―extinguishing an opponent without completely acknowledging his or her humanity, without
forging a relationship with one’s opponent, and without conveying a relationship of respect.72
Although neither Sparrow nor Sharkey make specific religious references in their ethical arguments,
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there is a strong precedent in both Christian and Jewish
cultural thought for many of the arguments that they
make. Recent Jewish holocaust theology speaks of the
importance of witness, of remembering those who
were killed by the Nazis and of not allowing them to be
simply nameless individuals who were dehumanized
and died, but rather of insisting upon their humanity.73
Christian theology speaks of the fact that every individual is made in the image of God (imago dei), and
therefore, every human life is sacred. Thus, one can
argue that allowing someone to be killed in a nameless,
faceless fashion by a drone, with their death never recognized, remembered, or mourned by another human
being, is a violation of both these Jewish and Christian
principles.
However, both Sparrow and Sharkey’s work also
depend on a second ethical principle beyond that of
respect. This is the idea of responsibility. Sparrow
ties together the twin concepts of responsibility and
respect, noting that in creating a situation where no
one is morally responsible for an individual’s death,
we are “treating our enemy like vermin, as though they
may be exterminated without moral regard at all.”74
Sparrow argues that the existence of a responsibility
gap in which no one might be held responsible for an
automated killing, whether it happens intentionally or
by mistake, is reason enough to outlaw these types of
technologies.75
The “responsibility gap” becomes of particular
concern in future scenarios in which unmanned autonomous vehicles might become fully autonomous or
automatic in the sense that they could engage in decision-making that would fully remove humans from
the decision-making process. Sharkey worries about a
future in which humans might be removed from the
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loop altogether. He notes that the one-to-one correspondence between the warfighter and an adversary
would be eliminated with the advent of new technologies that might allow one warfighter to control a
“swarm” of UAVs. In such a scenario, the individual
might not know which small UAV was specifically
responsible for a death, nor would he feel a sense of
personal responsibility for that death. Indeed, events
might happen at machine speed rather than human
speed, such that the individual would be unable to
track which specific actions had occurred, even if there
was a desire to do so.76
A final set of concerns relates to the ways in which
a nation might use drones to carry out constant or
near-constant surveillance of another nation’s population, including its civilians, as part of a preemptive
security strategy―even if, in fact, drone strikes never
occur. Analysts suggest that there is something humiliating or dehumanizing in the relationship between
the watcher and the watched. Analysts note that those
who are the subjects of this surveillance have not consented to it and may not be aware of its occurrence. In
addition, they argue, the implication is that everyone
being watched is viewed as being potentially guilty of
having committed a crime, or as a possible criminal subject. In this way, UAV surveillance technology creates
a hierarchical relationship between the watcher and
the watched that is humiliating to the weaker party.77
It has also been described as being ethically similar to
asking someone to live in a situation where there is a
loaded gun pointed at his or her head.78 Again, this is
not a new argument. Instead, it is the same argument
that was made in regards to asking individuals to live
under a so-called nuclear umbrella at the height of the
Cold War.79 The argument here is that individuals who
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believe that they might be the subject of a drone strike
at any time thus are put through stress and anxiety on
a daily basis, even though they may be innocent.
Table 8 provides a summary of the arguments
raised in this section.
Argument

Implications

Drones distance the warfighter from his opponent

•
•

Lack of respect
Adversary is dehumanized

Killing is no longer attribut- •
able to a specific person
•
•

Adversary is humiliated
Adversary is robbed of dignity
International right to be killed by a
human; anything less is subhuman

Killing is no longer an intimate act

Violates principle of chivalry
Lack of witness, remembrance

•
•

•
Drones allow for constant
surveillance of one’s adver•
saries

Threatens adversaries, even when
innocent
Creates fear, anxiety

Table 8. Ethical Arguments about the
Relationship between the State/Warfighter and
One’s Adversaries.
Responding to These Concerns
How should a military leader thus respond to
arguments that drone technologies show disrespect
and dishonor one’s relations with one’s opponents?
As noted, these particular arguments are likely to resonate with audiences, including civilian populations in
many nations that are considering the acquisition and
deployment of drones. The claim that drone strikes are
merciless and dehumanizing can be illustrated easily
through the airing of visual footage of drone strikes,
and thus this argument may be particularly compelling
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when aired on a television network. This argument
has also formed the basis of much of the eyewitness
testimony provided in U.S. Congressional Hearings
regarding proposed limitations and bans on drones.80
One possible line of argumentation involves querying the notion that the “responsibility gap” is something unique to UAV technology. As Purves et al. have
pointed out, the problem of responsibility actually
exists in all scenarios involving automated and automatic technologies. As they note, a similar problem
would exist with the advent of driverless cars. They
asked if people would have the same level of moral
repugnance toward a scenario where someone was
automatically run over by a driverless car, as they
would have if someone were automatically killed by
an unmanned autonomous vehicle.81 They note that as
automated killing―both intentional and accidental―
becomes common, the normative prohibition against
these actions may evolve and change. On the other
hand, given that people were morally repulsed many
years ago by the automated killings landmines carried
out, moral prohibition may be permanent.
The American response, however, also should
involve active engagement and response to some of
the concerns raised by these activists. Concerns simply
should not be dismissed. Instead, U.S. policymakers
and planners should acknowledge the validity of these
concerns and articulate their desire to cooperate with,
and even play a leading role in, the development of both
national and international constraints and laws, which
would prevent the development of fully automated
killing scenarios. The U.S. Department of Defense has
been part of this effort, as evinced by the 2013 statement that, in the foreseeable future, decision-making
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regarding targeting and use of force will be kept
under human control.82
Within the international community, U.S. policymakers actually may find more common ground with
drone opponents than they might expect. It is possible
that in the future the United States could take a leading role at international fora like the UN Convention
on Conventional Weapons as they work to develop
meaningful definitions of contested concepts like
“meaningful human control.” Active engagement by
U.S. policymakers in these initiatives may help to convince opponents that an outright ban on these weapons is not necessary, since it is possible and desirable
to shape strong and meaningful regulatory regimes.
Figure 3 provides some specific guidance that decision-makers can utilize in drafting a response.
Response Guidance
1. E
 mbrace Transparency. Release data on the actual identities and
number of casualties of drone strikes as appropriate – as a sign of
responsibility and respect to adversary states and the international
community.
Within the international community, the U.S. Government may
wish to take the lead formally in efforts and memorialize the dead
– rather than relying on efforts put forth by partisan organizations.
2. Refer to U.S. policies on Command Responsibility, in response to
queries about the accountability dilemma in drone practices.
3. Become familiar with the U.S. military policies in place for keeping
humans “in the loop” in regard to drone strikes.
4. Emphasize the differences between autonomous, semi-autonomous,
and automatic weapons.

Figure 3. Suggestions for Military DecisionMakers in Responding to Arguments about Drones
and their Relationship with One’s Opponents.
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EFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN
THE LONG TERM
Drone Strikes outside a declared war by a State on the
territory of another state without the consent of the latter
or of the United Nations Security Council constitute
a violation of international law and of the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of that country.83
The use of drones by states for targeted killings is
being led by the USA [United States of America], and
practiced also by Israel and the UK [United Kingdom].
Notoriously, US drone strikes have killed and injured
people of nations it is not at war with: Yemen, Somalia,
the Philippines, and, principally, Pakistan. The practice
is also seriously devaluing international law because the
USA refuses to abide by the rules of war and provide
information necessary for legal scrutiny. Effective
international control measures of drone use, proliferation
and development are urgently needed. After 10 years of
drone-enabled targeted killings, it is more than time that
UN member states responded appropriately.84
Pakistan regards such strikes as a violation of its
sovereignty and territorial integrity. These strikes also
have a negative impact on the government’s efforts to
bring peace and stability in Pakistan and the region.85

The next set of arguments uses a utilitarian or consequentialist framework to consider the long-term consequences for the international system of a shift in U.S.
policy to a heavy reliance on drones to solve conflicts.
These activists (and, frequently, official government
spokespeople) argue that UAV technologies are creating new understandings that threaten to undermine
existing norms and practices. As a result, they note
that drones can help to create an international system
that becomes more dangerous and unstable in the long
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run―even as they are being used to prevent or lessen
conflict in the short term.
In this framework, international stability and lawfulness is the value that most needs to be preserved.
Here, analysts stress that war traditionally has been
understood as a set of practices that occur between
states, utilizing professional combatants on a clearly
defined battlefield,86 in conditions when war formally
has been declared.87 These understandings have been
instrumental in shielding civilians from the effects of
war through making a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants, between the battlefield
and the places where civilians live, and between wartime and peacetime conditions. However, anti-drone
activists argue that new technologies threaten to erode
all of these distinctions―blurring the line between war
and peace,88 between the battlefield and the places
where civilians live, and between the activities of professional soldiers and the activities of other practitioners, including intelligence officers and government
functionaries.
As a result, according to some analysts, the United
States unwittingly also may force its adversaries to
undertake different actions on different battlefields.
That is, if we deny our adversaries the opportunity
to engage in traditional battle on a traditional battlefield against traditional soldiers, then they may transfer the battle to a new front inside the United States.
Boyle provides the example of the Times Square bomb
attempt by Pakistani American Faisal Shahzad in June
2010 as a situation in which war was brought home
to the United States.89 Thus, the consequences of U.S.
reliance on drone strikes will be to increase the threat
to civilians both abroad and in the United States.
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In addition, it has been argued that U.S. actions
taken in utilizing drone strikes, including failure to
declare war or to respect the sovereignty of nations
where strikes have been carried out, are creating a situation in which the United States appears to be violating international norms with impunity.90 As a result,
argues Christian Enemark, the long-run effect will be a
weakening of international norms, such as respect for
territorial sovereignty overall. International organizations like the UN will be perceived as weaker if they
are seen as unable to regulate or reign in U.S. actions.
The implication is that the United States has traded the
ability to carry out relatively risk-free, cheap strikes
against targets in the short run for the ability to serve
as an exemplar and upholder of international norms
regarding warfare in the long run.91 Troy has suggested
that U.S. use of precision strikes against terrorists has
done much to erode the normative prohibition against
assassination, making it more likely that other nations
will find it acceptable to engage in this behavior.92
In addition, activists and analysts note that using
U.S. drones in foreign nations may undermine the host
nation’s legitimacy through demonstrating that they
are weak and unable to handle a problem themselves
or to stand up to U.S. pressure. Greg Kennedy points
to the likelihood that U.S. drone strikes over Pakistan
might undermine its reputation, with the unforeseen
effect of leading to increased instability in the international community in the long run.93 Similarly, Boyle
argues that the use of drones in Pakistan suggests to
internal Pakistani observers, as well as those outside,
that Pakistan’s government is weak and unable to
handle its own unrest.94
Finally, activists note that the covert nature of drone
warfare can serve to undermine trust between allies
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and within the international system. The nation that
acts covertly can be seen as sneaky and untrustworthy,
and that reputation can spread into other aspects of
relations between allies and adversaries.95
Figure 4 presents the arguments raised in this
section.
Arguments
1. D
 rone strikes erode distinction between civilian/combatant; battlefield/not battlefield; peacetime/war time.
2. Drone strikes undermine the legitimacy of the nation where strikes
occur.
3. Drone strikes undermine international norms when the United
States is seen to act with impunity.
4. Drones strikes undermine trust between allies.
5. Short-term gains are not worth long-term costs.

Figure 4. Ethical Arguments about Drone
Effects on the International System.
Responding to Criticisms
So how should a military decision-maker or leader
respond to arguments about the ways in which the
use of drones can change or shape the international
system? U.S. military leaders need to be prepared for
this situation since this type of ethical argument is
common in many places―such as among opposition
politicians and citizens in Australia, in Pakistan, and
in the UN.
While each of the objections raised above―that
drone strikes undermine trust between allies, weaken
the reputation of states which serve as the base or site
of a drone attack, and weaken the enforcement mechanisms of the international system―are ethical issues,
they (like the respect issues referenced earlier) appear
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to be solvable through increased regulation and oversight. They are not zero-sum issues (like the virtue
issues or technological issues) for which the only possible solution is an outright ban on these weapons.
Thus, the best strategy for U.S. policymakers in
responding to these concerns is first to acknowledge
them as valid. The United States needs to acknowledge that, at present, what appear to be violations of
national sovereignty have occurred. At this point, a
number of possible responses could be made.
The most cautious or conciliatory strategy would
involve acknowledging that violations had occurred
and articulating a desire to work with allies and other
parties to find better ways of verifying and responding to violations. In particular, Kennedy has suggested
creating a domestic oversight body that would collect
the facts and then decide about the legality of drone
strikes before authorizing them―in the same way that
the foreign intelligence Surveillance Courts judge matters involving the collection of intelligence on American soil.96 In the future, norms might evolve regarding
notification protocols for letting the international community know the conditions under which drone strikes
might occur. Finally, as Megan Braun and Daniel Brunstetter point out, there are already specific Just War
principles for situations of jus ad vim or use of force
short of war, which can be drawn upon for making
ethical decisions about the proper and improper use of
drones in specific conflicts.97
A more risky strategy is one in which U.S. policymakers query the notion that existing norms regarding sovereignty and legality are still valid, given the
changing environment in today’s world. Here, policymakers may wish to note that currently there are many
“small wars” and hybrid conflicts that do not fit neatly
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into existing international law frameworks. Thus, one
could argue that norms are in a period of flux, or even
that norms are outdated. Most conflicts today are not
between states, most are not declared formally, and
most are not ended with an official treaty. Thus, rather
than responding to particular legal concerns about
particular drone strikes, policymakers may wish to
take the offensive through suggesting that norms need
to be changing, and the United States should be in the
forefront of rewriting and enforcing new norms. Figure
5 presents some guidance on this topic.
Response Guidance
1. Leaders can begin by questioning whether the norms being referenced (such as the combatant/noncombatant distinction and the
war/peace distinction) are still relevant given the actions of actors
like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al Qaeda, and Russia
in its invasion of Ukraine. It is suggested that in a changing world
where hybrid wars and undeclared wars appear to be the norm, the
United States is not violating international norms by merely reacting to other’s violations of those norms.
2. Make the argument that norms can evolve and change over time
and that they have done so before.
3. Note that norms rest on an agreement between all members to
respect such norms – that might not exist at present.
4. Reiterate a desire to work with the international community to
come up with Rules of Engagement for conflicts involving drones
and to follow those norms once established.

Figure 5. Suggestions for Military Decision-Makers
in Responding to Arguments about Drones’ Effects
on the International System.
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DRONES MAKE CERTAIN TACTICS AND
STRATEGIES MORE LIKELY
If any major military power pushes ahead with AI
weapon development, a global arms race is virtually
inevitable, and the endpoint of this technological
trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become
the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons,
they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so
they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant
military powers to mass-produce. It will only be a matter
of time until they appear on the black market and in the
hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control
their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic
cleansing, etc. Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks
such as assassinations, destabilizing nations, subduing
populations and selectively killing a particular ethnic
group.98

The last set of ethical arguments is military-strategic in nature. Here, analysts argue that specific facets
of UAV technology may facilitate the adoption of
particular warfighting tactics and strategies that pose
ethical problems of their own. Analysts raise concerns
about three possibilities: First, some have argued that
the ability of drones to conduct surgical strikes with
a high degree of precision may therefore lead states
to choose UAV strikes over other types of responses
to conflict, including diplomacy. The cheapness and
ease of calling for and conducting drone strikes thus
might lead to a climate in which the standard response
to a conflict is one of preemptively ending it through
precision strikes rather than engaging in dialogue
and negotiation. Shank refers to “President Obama’s
‘military first’ strategy,” suggesting that the availability of the drone weapon is at least partially responsible for America’s leadership developing a preference
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for combat over other forms of international engagement.99 (It should be noted that Shank is writing for a
Quaker organization and his argument echoes other,
older pacifist arguments, which raise a warning about
the possibility of cheap or easy war and its ability to
skew how we think about conflict.)
Second, the reliance on drones as a platform in U.S.
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies
may have led planners and analysts to ignore other
facets of the counterterrorism problem. Specifically,
some analysts have argued that planners today may be
less concerned with identifying and engaging with the
root causes of terrorism, including economic insecurity
and state failure, in favor of a more short-term solution
of eliminating specific terrorists. In this way, planners
are not considering the needs of societies that may be
producing terrorists, nor are they responding to those
needs of the population in these states, including civilian needs. A counterterrorism strategy that relies heavily on drones thus may cause military personnel to see
specific individuals as the causes of terrorism, rather
than considering the role of ideas or other factors in
creating the problem.100
Third, as noted previously, some analysts have suggested that the cheapness and ease with which drone
strikes can be carried out has created an orientation
toward the use of covert activities carried out by individuals who may not be professional military soldiers.
This possibility has implications for the long-run health
of the international system, including the preservation
of norms regarding the rules of engagement and laws
of war, as well as for the long-run health of domestic
politics in countries that are considered democracies.
In each of these three scenarios, one can identify
individuals who support the assertion as well as those
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who do not. However, as Figure 6 shows, all of these
arguments might also be labelled as arguments over
policy rather than arguments specifically about UAV
weapons.
Arguments about Strategies and Tactics
1. Cheapness and ease of use may cause decision-makers to choose
precision strikes over other strategies, including diplomacy.
2. Over-reliance on drones in couterterrorism strategy may lead
policymakers to ignore other long-run problems, like poverty and
the rise of ideologies.
3. Over-reliance on drones may lead to situations where military
actions are not cleary delineated and where they are carried out by a
variety of actors, not all of whom are military.

Figure 6. Suggestions for Military Decision-Makers
in Responding to Arguments about Drones’ Effects
on Choice of Military Strategy.
Responding to These Concerns
How should a military decision-maker respond to
anti-drone arguments dealing specifically with strategies and tactics that might be facilitated by drones?
Here a military spokesperson is likely to have the
upper hand, since these anti-drone arguments are specifically concerned with strategy and tactics, thus creating a situation where the military spokesman is sure
to have a great deal of expertise.
The military spokesperson could begin by making
the point that the decision to adopt a particular strategy or tactic is driven by a complex number of factors,
and that it seldom is guided merely by the selection
of weapons available or a preference by planners for
the use of a particular weapon. Here, the spokesperson
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should emphasize as well the fact that military decisions seldom are made in isolation. Instead, military
decision-making is a complex process taking into
account a number of variables, to include the political,
social, and economic situation in the country where
action is anticipated or contemplated. In addition,
planners should emphasize that any specific military
decision is part of a much larger, long-range strategy
that is set forth in documents such as the U.S. National
Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review.
The argument that the availability of a particular
weapon drives U.S. or any other military policy is a
shortsighted argument which evinces a lack of knowledge about how strategic priorities are set. Figure 7
provides some specific guidance.
Strategic Priority Guidance
1. Demonstrate that the choice of strategy is part of a complex decison-making process, in which the choice of weapon is only a small
part of the whole picture.
2. Question the assertion that a particular weapon can force a defense
planner or policymaker to adopt a particular strategy or tactic.
3. When possible, emphasize the ways in which military strategy is
part of a larger strategy, which includes military, economic, and
other aspects.

Figure 7. Suggestions for Military Decision-Makers
in Responding to Arguments about Drones’ Effects
on Choice of Military Strategy.
CONCLUSION
As this document has shown, there is not just one
anti-drone argument or even one type of anti-drone
argument. Instead, the arguments can take different
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forms, drawing upon different ethical and philosophical standpoints and different historical examples and
analogues. In responding to anti-drone arguments,
then, it is important for leaders to consider the type
of argument that is being made, the assumptions
upon which it rests, and the concerns that are being
expressed. Arguments about the rights of those targeted are very different from arguments about how
this technology is likely to change the international
system or the realm of strategic and tactical options
available in the future. Hopefully, this field guide has
provided a foundation for more fruitful dialogues
on this important issue through identifying common
ground, as well as differences in approaches between
both the pro- and the anti-drone camps.
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